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ORIGIN EB-07

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 /020 R

66620

DRAFTED BY:EB/ITP/EWT:MTLORIMER:ERS

APPROVED BY:EB/ITP/EWT:MTLORIMER

EUR/RPE-RHARDING

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R 220050Z MAR 75

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USMISSION EC BRUSSELS

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 065247

FOL REPEAT BUDAPEST 0787 SENT ACTION SECSTATE INFO BUCHAREST
MOSCOW SOFIA WARSAW GENEVA AND USDEL MTN GENEVA MARCH 19, 1975

QUOTE

C O N F I D E N T I A L BUDAPEST 0787

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: ETRD, HU

SUBJ: EXTENSION OF MFN AND HUNGARY'S POSITION IN GATT

1. SUMMARY: SENIOR FOREIGN TRADE OFFICIALS AND HUNGARIAN
GATT REPRESENTATIVE JANOS NYERGES TOLD US IN RECENT DIS-
CUSSION THAT IN ANY FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS WITH U.S. ON POSSIBLE
TRADE AGREEMENT HUNGARY WOULD INSIST THAT MFN BE EXTENDED
UNCONDITIONALLY ON THE BASIS OF OUR MEMBERSHIP IN GATT.
NYERGES ADDED THAT EVEN IF U.S. AND USSR WERE ABLE TO SOLVE
CURRENT DIFFERENCES ON EMIGRATION AND CONCLUDE TRADE AGREE-
MENT, HUNGARY COULD NOT ACCEPT MFN FROM U.S. UNDER TERMS
OF TRADE REFORM ACT OF 1974. ACCEPTING MFN ON SUCH A
CONDITIONAL BASIS WOULD SERIOUSLY WEAKEN HUNGARY'S
BARGAINING POSITION IN GATT VIS-A-VIS EC COUNTRIES WHICH
BY FAR HUNGARY'S MOST IMPORTANT TRADING PARTNERS. NYERGES
INDICATED FURTHER THAT HE ATTEMPTING TO ORGANIZE UNITED
FRONT OF HUNGARY, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, BULGARIA, AND HOPEFULLY
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POLAND IN TAKING COMMON POSITION IN CURRENT GATT ROUND TO

KEEP THESE COUNTRIES FROM LOSING SOME OF WHAT THEY HAD GAINED DURING PREVIOUS TRADE NEGOTIATIONS. POLAND HAD ALREADY BEEN APPROACHED BY EC WITH SUGGESTIONS THAT IT CONSIDER MAKING CERTAIN CONCESSIONS REGARDING ITS MFN RIGHTS AND WAS EVIDENTLY CONSIDERING THIS OFFER SERIOUSLY. EMBASSY'S OPINION THAT WHILE NYERGES' REMARKS MAY ACCURATELY REFLECT CURRENT GOH THINKING, THIS HARD LINE ON POSSIBLE TRADE NEGOTIATIONS WITH US MOST PROBABLY NEGOTIATING PLOY TO HELP STRENGTHEN HUNGARIAN POSITION AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE VIS-A-VIS EEC AT A TIME WHEN CHANCES FOR EARLY NEGOTIATION OF U.S.-HUNGARIAN BILATERAL TRADE ACCORD APPEAR REMOTE. END SUMMARY.

2. IN RECENT CONVERSATION WITH JANOS NYERGES, HUNGARY'S GATT REPRESENTATIVE, HE INFORMED US THAT HUNGARY NOT WILLING TO NEGOTIATE WITH U.S. UNDER TERMS OF TRADE ACT OF 1974. NYERGES STATED THAT U.S. SHOULD NOT INVITE HUNGARY TO BEGIN NEGOTIATIONS AS GOH WOULD HAVE TO GIVE NEGATIVE REPLY. NYERGES CONTINUED THAT TITLE 4 OF TRADE ACT DISCRIMINATES AGAINST EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AND EVEN IF IT WERE TO BE MODIFIED BY REPEAL OF THE JACKSON-VANIK AMENDMENT, IT WOULD STILL BE UNACCEPTABLE TO GOH. THE ACT (SECTIONS 402 AND 404) PROVIDES FOR POSSIBLE TEMPORARY EXTENSION OF MFN TREATMENT TO COUNTRIES LIKE HUNGARY WHEREAS UNDER GATT ONCE MFN IS EXTENDED TO A CONTRACTING PARTY (IN U.S. CASE BY DISINVOCATION OF GATT ARTICLE 35), MFN CANNOT BE WITHDRAWN FROM THAT CONTRACTING PARTY ALONE. THUS ONCE ARTICLE 35 OF GATT IS DISINVOKED BY A CONTRACTING PARTY, MFN PROVISIONS OF GATT APPLY AND CANNOT BE WITHDRAWN UNLESS CONTRACTING PARTY WOULD WITHDRAW FROM GATT OR OBTAIN A SPECIAL WAIVER.

3. ACCORDING TO NYERGES, EVEN IF SOVIET UNION AND U.S. ABLE TO FIND SOLUTION TO PROBLEM OF FREEDOM OF EMIGRATION IN U.S. TRADE, AND U.S. AND USSR WERE TO NEGOTIATE BILATERAL TRADE AGREEMENT CONSISTENT WITH TRADE ACT OF 1974, HUNGARY WOULD NOT DO SO. GOH FINDS UNACCEPTABLE PROVISIONS OF TRADE ACT, I.E., SECTION 411 THAT PUT NON-MARKET ECONOMY COUNTRIES "IN A GHETTO", AND HUNGARY WOULD PREFER TO AWAIT DISPASSIONATELY FOR A MORE PROMISING FRAMEWORK FOR

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NEGOTIATIONS SO IT WOULD BE ABLE TO CONCLUDE A TRULY NON-DISCRIMINATORY AGREEMENT WITH U.S.

4. NYERGES STATED HUNGARY'S MOST IMPORTANT GATT RELATIONSHIPS WITH EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND THAT HUNGARY'S TRADE WITH U.S. COMPARATIVELY MINOR MATTER. IF HUNGARY WERE TO ACCEPT FROM U.S. TEMPORARY MFN TREATMENT, CONDITIONALLY RENEWABLE, EC WOULD NO DOUBT INSIST THAT HUNGARY TRADE WITH IT ALSO

ON THAT BASIS. THEREFORE IMPORTANT THING FOR HUNGARY IS NOT TO OBTAIN TEMPORARY MFN FROM U.S. BUT RATHER TO RETAIN PERMANENT MFN WHICH EC IS NOW OBLIGED TO GIVE HUNGARY UNDER TERMS OF GATT.

5. NYERGES RECALLED WITH GREAT PLEASURE ASSISTANCE GIVEN BY U.S. TO HUNGARY IN DEALING WITH EUROPEAN COMMUNITY WHEN HUNGARIANS NEGOTIATING ITS ACCESSION TO GATT. HE EXPRESSED HOPE THAT U.S. WILL BE ABLE TO JOIN WITH HUNGARY, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, BULGARIA, PERHAPS POLAND AND WESTERN ECONOMIES IN ASSOCIATION WITH EUROPEAN COMMUNITY IN FURTHERING THEIR COMMON INTERESTS DURING NEGOTIATIONS WITH EC IN TOKYO ROUND. WHILE NYERGES OF OPINION THAT TRADE ACT OF 1974 WILL GREATLY WEAKEN MORAL FORCE OF U.S. IN JOINING WITH EE AND OTHER COUNTRIES IN SEEKING TO OBTAIN LIBERAL TRADE ARRANGEMENTS FROM EC, HE IS MOST ANXIOUS TO DISCUSS THIS QUESTION WITH QUALIFIED TRADE REPRESENTATIVES IN GENEVA. IT ALSO SUGGESTED THAT HE CONTACT MANUEL ABRAMS OR ROBERT BRUNGART OF USMISSION UPON HIS RETURN TO GENEVA LATER THIS WEEK.

6. NYERGES REMARKED THAT EC IS CURRENTLY MAKING OVERTURES TO POLAND IN HOPE THAT IT WILL ACCEPT TERMS WHICH WOULD UNDERCUT THOSE WON BY EE COUNTRIES IN PREVIOUS GATT NEGOTIATIONS. HE SAYS THAT HE HOPES TO BE ABLE TO DISSUADE POLAND FROM MAKING SUCH CONCESSIONS AND THAT HE WILL BE ABLE TO ASSOCIATE CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND BULGARIA WITH HUNGARY IN JOINT APPROACH TO EC ON THIS QUESTION. NYERGES STATED HIS CURRENT PROBLEM WAS WHETHER TO ADVOCATE WHETHER ALL FOUR EE COUNTRIES SEEK ACCOMMODATIONS WITH EUROPEAN COMMUNITY OR ATTEMPT TO HAVE THE FOUR JOIN WITH THE U.S. AND OTHER WESTERN MARKET ECONOMY COUNTRIES IN NEGOTIATIONS
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WITH THE COMMUNITY.

7. NYERGES SAID THE SOVIETS MAY POSSIBLY WISH TO PARTICIPATE IN TOKYO ROUND. AT PRESENT THEY ARE CONSIDERING POSSIBLE PARTICIPATION -- SOMETHING THEY WOULD NOT HAVE DONE TWO YEARS AGO. HE COULD NOT PREDICT WHAT DECISION THEY MIGHT REACH.

8. REGARDING U.S.-ROMANIAN TRADE NEGOTIATIONS, NYERGES EXPRESSED CURIOSITY. HE APPARENTLY SUSPECTS THAT ROMANIANS WISH TO CONCLUDE TRADE AGREEMENT WITH U.S. MERELY TO SHOW INDEPENDENCE FROM USSR. WHEN ASKED WHAT PRACTICAL ADVANTAGES ROMANIANS MIGHT EXPECT FROM THIS COURSE OF ACTION, NYERGES MERELY LAUGHED AND SAID THIS WAS TYPICAL AMERICAN QUESTION.

9. COMMENT: NYERGES' REMARKS OFFER EXTENSIVE BACKGROUND ON ASSERTIONS MADE TO US BY RANKING OFFICIALS ON NUMEROUS OCCASIONS THAT GOH IN NEGOTIATING TRADE AGREEMENT WITH U.S. WOULD INSIST THAT NEGOTIATIONS BE BASED UPON OUR MUTUAL GATT RELATIONSHIP. THIS POSITION OBVIOUSLY ONE PERSONALLY FORMULATED BY NYERGES. HOWEVER WE TEND TO QUESTION NYERGES' ASSERTION THAT EVEN IF U.S. AND USSR WERE TO FIND SOME SOLUTION TO PROBLEM OF EMIGRATION AND BILATERAL TRADE AGREEMENT WERE TO BE CONCLUDED, HUNGARY WOULD STILL NOT NEGOTIATE WITH U.S. ON BASIS OF 1974 TRADE REFORM ACT. OUR EXPERIENCE HAS BEEN THAT HUNGARIANS HAVE TENDED TO PUSH ARGUMENT THAT THEY WOULD NEGOTIATE ONLY ON BASIS OF GATT WHEN PROSPECTS FOR MFN HAVE TENDED TO BE REMOTE, NO DOUBT IN AN EFFORT TO STRENGTHEN THEIR BARGAINING POSITION VIS-A-VIS WEST EUROPEANS. BUT DURING PERIOD FOLLOWING TRADE BILL PASSAGE AND ANNOUNCEMENT OF SOVIET REJECTION, HUNGARIANS SHOWED CONSIDERABLE ENTHUSIASM REGARDING POSSIBILITY THAT TRADE AGREEMENT MIGHT BE REACHED AT EARLY DATE AND WERE VISIBLY AND DEEPLY DISAPPOINTED WHEN SOVIET REJECTION OF TERMS OF TRADE REFORM ACT ELIMINATED POSSIBILITY OF SPEEDY CONCLUSION OF U.S.-HUNGARIAN COMMERCIAL ACCORD. SINCE SOVIET REJECTION OF TERMS OF TRADE ACT WE HAVE AGAIN BEGUN TO HEAR ON A REGULAR BASIS STATEMENT THAT HUNGARY WILL ONLY NEGOTIATE FUTURE TRADE AGREEMENT WITH US ON BASIS OF GATT.

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10. IT IS UNDERSTANDABLE THAT NYERGES, AS HUNGARY'S FOREMOST EXPERT ON GATT, WOULD BE PARTICULARLY INSISTENT ON PURSUING ANY FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE U.S. ON BASIS OF OUR MUTUAL GATT MEMBERSHIP. WE ALSO BELIEVE THAT NYERGES' VIEWS CARRY CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT OF WEIGHT IN FORMULATION OF HUNGARIAN FOREIGN TRADE POLICY VIS-A-VIS DEVELOPED WESTERN COUNTRIES. NEVERTHELESS, WE INCLINED TO DOUBT THAT HIS ARGUMENTS, AS OUTLINED ABOVE, WOULD CARRY DAY IF THERE WERE A REAL POSSIBILITY OF EARLY RESOLUTION MFN ISSUE ON BASIS OF TRADE REFORM ACT.
PEDERSEN

UNQUOTE. INGERSOLL

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: POLICIES, MEMBERSHIP, MFN, NEGOTIATIONS, TRADE AGREEMENTS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 22 MAR 1975
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: ElyME
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1975STATE065247
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: EB/ITP/EWT:MTLORIMER:ERS
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D750101-0579
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1975/newtext/t19750324/aaaaavwt.tel
Line Count: 215
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ORIGIN EB
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 4
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: ElyME
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 16 APR 2003
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <16 APR 2003 by ShawDG>; APPROVED <22 SEP 2003 by ElyME>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
05 JUL 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: EXTENSION OF MFN AND HUNGARY'S POSITION IN GATT
TAGS: ETRD, HU, US, GATT
To: EC BRUSSELS
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 05 JUL 2006